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A B S T R A C T   
To develop rehabilitative treatment programs for persons who have committed crimes, correctional psychologists 
build theoretical structures that weld theoretical ideas about the causes of criminal behavior, theoretical per-
spectives about appropriate targets for correctional intervention and normative assumptions about crime and the 
aims of correctional intervention. To differentiate the tri-partite theoretical structure with which correctional 
program designers' work, Ward and Durrant (2021) introduce the metatheoretical concept of “practice frame-
works”. In this paper, I describe and evaluate this concept, situating my analysis within the broader contexts of 
philosophical work on scientific theories and models and metatheoretical work on the structure of explanatory 
and intervention theories in correctional psychology.   
1. Introduction 
As an outsider looking in on the fields of forensic and correctional 
psychology, one might assume that theories or explanatory models that 
are successful in identifying the causes of criminal behavior would be 
sufficient guides for developing interventions to prevent it or its recur-
rence. However, in their paper, “Practice frameworks in correctional 
psychology: Translating causal theories and normative assumptions into 
practice”, Tony Ward and Russil Durrant (2021) argue that etiological 
theories of crime on their own are insufficient tools “for constructing and 
delivering a range of interventions to individuals who have committed 
crimes.” Ward and Durrant make the case that correctional psychology 
requires a new concept to distinguish the kind of multi-dimensional 
tools that clinicians and correctional program designers working in 
applied contexts require to effectively develop and administer in-
terventions to individuals who have committed crimes. They dub these 
tools “practice frameworks”, explain the components that go into their 
construction, and provide two illustrative examples of the kind of 
theoretical frameworks they have in mind. 
Acknowledging that different kinds of “practice frameworks” are 
liable to be operative in pure and applied contexts in correctional psy-
chology, Ward and Durrant also advocate for what they dub 
“coordinated pluralism” The basic idea is that, given the diversity of 
individuals who commit criminal offenses and the kinds of challenges 
they confront, there is no one-size-fits all practice framework providing 
the resources necessary to develop a universally effective treatment or 
rehabilitation program for criminal offenders. Rather, practitioners 
ought to have the flexibility to draw on resources from different practice 
frameworks to offer those criminal offenders with whom they work 
treatment interventions capable of meeting each individual's particular 
needs. 
In this paper, I describe and critically evaluate Ward and Durrant's 
concept of practice frameworks in correctional psychology, situating my 
analysis within the broader contexts of philosophical work on scientific 
theories and models and metalevel discussions in forensic psychology on 
the nature and relationship between etiological and intervention the-
ories of crime. I begin, in Section 2, by identifying some basic conceptual 
distinctions between theories, frameworks, and models to ground my 
analysis. I then turn, in Section 3, to consider a set of insights on offer in 
the metatheoretical literature in correctional psychology on the struc-
ture of and relationships between different etiological and intervention 
theories. In Sections 4 and 5, I engage in a critical appraisal of Ward and 
Durrant's concept of practice frameworks and identify some challenges 
that relate to the meta-level tasks of evaluating and coordinating 
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different practice frameworks in both pure and applied contexts in 
correctional psychology. I end by identifying potential strategies for 
responding to such challenges. 
2. Some conceptual distinctions 
There is a rich, vast and growing literature in correctional psychol-
ogy aimed at understanding and critically evaluating the nature and 
structure of theories and practices in pure and applied contexts. Ward 
and Durrant are introducing the concept of “practice frameworks” into 
these metalevel discussions in correctional psychology with an eye to-
wards improving correctional responses to criminal behavior. This work 
is “metalevel” or “metatheoretical” (e.g., Ward & Hudson, 1998) insofar 
as it involves theoretical discussions about the very objects of correc-
tional psychology, which include theories, models, frameworks, theo-
rists, researchers, and practitioners working in applied contexts. This 
work is also prescriptive insofar as it advocates a particular approach to 
relating different “theories” or “frameworks” to each other with an eye 
towards making correctional responses to crime more effective. This 
critical metalevel work goes on in parallel with routine scientific work to 
develop and refine theories of criminal behavior, research aimed at 
identifying its causes, theoretical and empirical work aimed at identi-
fying effective interventions for responding to crime, work to develop 
and implement correctional interventions and research to assess the 
efficacy of these interventions. Given the complex structure of the 
domain of correctional psychology, it is worthwhile to approach met-
alevel discussions of the kind in which Ward and Durrant are engaged 
armed with some basic conceptual distinctions concerning theories, 
models and frameworks. 
As a first pass, a scientific theory, in the conventional sense, consists 
of sets of general principles that are posited to understand the behavior 
of large classes of phenomena.1 These principles are general insofar as 
they are pitched at a highly abstract level. Theories contain terms or 
constructs (e.g., “risk”) that are defined generally and with respect to 
other terms (e.g., “crimogenic need”) in the theoretical network. To 
make the principles and terms or constructs they contain less abstract 
and more accessible, theoretical terms are often defined operationally 
by specifying criteria of application for them (e.g., Cronbach & Meehl, 
1955). This may be done by those theoreticians that have introduced a 
new theory and who aim to further develop it. It is not uncommon, 
however, in pure and applied contexts to encounter different strategies 
for identifying, detecting or measuring instances of the same theoretical 
construct. Thus, the same theoretical term (e.g., “well-being”) may be 
defined differently depending upon the network of concepts in which it 
is embedded. In other words, theoretical terms may be subject to 
different interpretations and different operationalizations in pure 
research and applied contexts. This prompts an interesting question as to 
whether when different practitioners use the same term (e.g., “well- 
being”), they mean the same thing by it, and whether theories that use 
the same terms but with different meanings can be readily integrated.2 
A scientific model is a tool that is partially informed by a scientific 
theory, but typically independent from that theory. Models have been 
conceived of as “mediators” in the philosophical literature insofar as 
they mediate between scientific theories and the world (e.g., Morrison & 
Morgan, 1999). They are eclectic given that their construction may draw 
on many different sources—empirical results, anecdotes, narrati-
ves—and they bring these elements together to achieve specific 
explanatory, predictive or intervention aims. As philosopher of science 
Marcel Boumans (1999) aptly puts it, “model building is like baking a 
cake without a recipe” – you may begin with some knowledge about 
making cakes (e.g., basic ingredients, that it requires stirring the batter, 
a cake pan, and baking in an oven) and general ideas about the desired 
goal (e.g., what the cake ought to look like), but similar to making a cake 
with no recipe, there is no rule book for constructing a model; it is at the 
discretion of the designer. This freedom may be both a benefit, insofar as 
it provides the designer with flexibility in designing a model, but it may 
also be a limitation if models of the same phenomenon/phenomena 
proliferate without making clear contact with each other, due to, for 
example, differences in how the components of a model are arranged 
and thought to interact or differences in how specific theoretical con-
structs are defined. 
The meaning of the term “theoretical framework”, in contrast to 
“theory”, may itself differ depending upon the context in which the term 
is used. If one is in the earliest stages of developing a scientific theory, 
the basic outline of the theory that serves as a guide for research in route 
to developing a more detailed theory may be referred to as a “theoretical 
framework”. In contrast, in scientific research studies, it is not uncom-
mon for practitioners to appeal to only a subset of the components of a 
dominant theory in a field as a basis to formulate a research question, 
structure a research study or develop or implement an intervention. 
These components are understood to constitute a “theoretical frame-
work” to guide research, develop interventions and/or interpret exper-
imental results (see for example, Kivunja, 2018). On a third 
understanding of “framework”, as Ward and Durrant (2021) understand 
the term, it is a structure into which components from different theories 
or models may be “plugged”, which then serves the function of 
grounding and informing treatment interventions. 
Although Ward and Durrant refer variously to “practice frameworks” 
and “practice theories”, as if the concepts of “framework” and “theory” 
are interchangeable, practice frameworks on their definition exhibit 
features some philosophers of science have attributed exclusively to 
models (e.g., Boumans, 1999; Morrison & Morgan, 1999)—namely, they 
integrate information from different sources, they are hybrid, eclectic 
and there is no rule book for their construction even if one has a rough 
idea of what kinds of elements go into them. As I explain in the next 
section, etiological and treatment theories and models in correctional 
psychology are also described by practitioners as having this complex 
and hybrid structure.3 
3. The metatheoretical structure of correctional psychology 
The scientific study of crime includes theories aimed at under-
standing, explaining and predicting criminal behavior as well as theories 
designed to guide the development of correctional responses in the form 
of treatment and rehabilitative programs for criminal offenders. It is not 
unusual, however, for the two types of theories to share components in 
common, given that scientists interested in identifying the causes of 
crime also desire to prevent it. Different psychological, social, environ-
mental and biological risk factors may be appealed to in order to explain 
why an individual committed a crime, but they also may be used to 
predict the likelihood that they will engage in offending behavior in the 
future and to inform the structure of clinical and programmatic treat-
ment intervention programs. To take one example, the principles of risk, 
need and responsivity, which are used as a basis to classify criminal 
offenders, feature in the General Personality and Cognitive Social Learning 
Theory of Criminal Conduct (GPCSL) (e.g., Fortune & Heffernan, 2019), 
which is an explanatory theory of crime, but also serve as the basis for 
Andrews and Bonta's development of the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) 
model of offender rehabilitation, which is a treatment model (Bonta & 
Andrews, 2017; see also Polaschek, 2012). As Devon Polaschek (2012, 
1 This basic understanding of scientific theories is consistent with how Ward 
and Durrant understand them as “systematically linked set[s] of ideas that are 
used to guide action, or to explain or group together phenomena in a domain.”  
2 I will return to this point later in Section 5. 
3 Perhaps these observations simply leave open the question of when some-
thing should be called a model versus when it should be called a theory or a 
framework. It may not matter, and we should be open to the possibility that 
these different kinds of things may share elements and features in common. 
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2) notes, it is not uncommon for “promising crime theories” like the RNR 
model, to be translated “into effective correctional service practices.” 
I am interested in engaging in two tasks in this section. On the one 
hand, I want to relate Ward and Durrant's (2021) initial claims moti-
vating the need for “practice frameworks” in correctional psychology to 
ideas on offer in the “metatheoretical” (Ward & Hudson, 1998) litera-
ture about the tri-partite structure of etiological and intervention the-
ories in correctional psychology (e.g., Polaschek, 2012; Ward & Hudson, 
1998). As I aim to show, this analysis provides additional support for the 
idea that etiological and intervention theories serve as inappropriate 
guides for treatment interventions beyond those reasons that Ward and 
Durrant (2021) identify in their paper. Second, I want to use this met-
atheoretical discussion as a basis for characterizing what a correctional 
program designer confronts when they look to the theoretical literature 
on the causes of criminal behavior and/or theoretical literature on 
correctional interventions for guidance as to how to develop an inter-
vention program for criminal offenders. As correctional psychologists 
have argued, the theoretical terrain is complex with new explanatory 
and etiological theories emerging all the time, and this points to the 
importance of training practitioners who are engaged in designing 
treatment and rehabilitative programs how to understand the relevance 
of this literature to their practical aims (“theoretical literacy” Ward, 
2021; Ward & Durrant, 2021). A further aim of this section is to point to 
the possibility that, not only as Ward and Durrant suggest, are there a 
plurality of practice frameworks on offer in the correctional psychology 
literature, but also, practice frameworks may themselves vary in detail 
depending upon whether they are being constructed by high-level the-
orists or implemented by correctional program developers working in 
applied contexts. As I explain in Section 5, this is a feature of practice 
frameworks that both theorists and practitioners should keep in mind 
when attempting to coordinate different frameworks in pure and applied 
contexts. 
3.1. Etiological theories of criminal behavior 
Consider a hypothetical scenario, a practitioner working in the 
correctional system is interested in developing a treatment program for 
sex offenders in her care.4 The interventions that she has attempted 
previously with this group, which have included individual and group 
level therapy, have only been successful in a couple of cases and she 
wants to try something new. She begins by investigating the literature on 
etiological theories of crime. What she finds is a plurality of different 
theories and different explanations of sexual offending (e.g., Ward et al., 
2006; Ward & Hudson, 1998; Ward et al., 2019). Yet, it is not merely the 
plurality of theories and explanations that makes it difficult for her to be 
able to identify a precise causal node (e.g., risk, well-being) at which she 
might aim to intervene to treat her clients; there are different types of 
theoretical structures that she encounters and the level of detail or 
abstractness at which a given theory or hypothesis about the causes of 
crime is pitched may be difficult to decipher, making the move from 
translating that theory or hypothesis into a workable treatment inter-
vention difficult. 
More specifically, according to Ward and Hudson (1998), theories of 
sexual offending may be guided by different strategies for theory con-
struction and the theories that result may be understood as situated at 
one of three different levels of detail or abstraction. At the top-most level 
(Level I), investigators aim to develop multifactorial theories that can 
account for the “onset, development, and maintenance” of different 
types of sexual offending. These theories are ultimately intended to be 
“integrative” etiological theories insofar as they point to different kinds 
of causal mechanisms (e.g., biological, behavioral, developmental, so-
ciological) implicated in sexual offending in order to explain it. It is not 
uncommon, however, for such theories to begin with only “a loosely 
associated set of constructs with which to approach empirical prob-
lems”, which only later come to be better defined and integrated into a 
multifactorial theory in which their “relationships with each other are 
spelled out" (Ward & Hudson, 1998, 48–49). Depending upon what 
stage of development an integrative etiological theory or explanation is 
in (i.e., if the constructs are only loosely related versus tightly inte-
grated), and the educational and training background our practitioner 
has, it may be challenging for her to readily appeal to it to construct a 
treatment intervention, though it may serve as a kind of rough guide. 
Ward and Hudson (1998) describe the second or “middle” tier as 
consisting of theories that focus on a single factor to explain sexual 
crimes. Theories at this level “clearly describe” “the various structures 
and processes constituting the variable of interest” as well as “the rela-
tionship” among these different structures and processes (Ward & 
Hudson, 1998, 48). These theories serve as a basis for the construction of 
comprehensive or multifactorial theories of sexual offending one level 
above (Level I). For a practitioner working with sex offenders in a 
correctional setting, however, it will not be clear, if looking at a single 
etiological theory at this level, how to translate it into practical mea-
sures. Moreover, given that it is widely accepted that a theory positing a 
single causal factor to explain criminal behavior is inadequate, single 
factor theories will not serve as an adequate guide for our practitioner to 
develop more effective correctional interventions for her clients. 
The third and bottom-most tier (Level III) consists of what Ward and 
Hudson (1998, 48) refer to as the construction of “descriptive models of 
the offense chain or relapse process”—“micromodels” that “typically 
specify the cognitive, behavioral, motivational and social factors asso-
ciated with the commission of a sexual offense.” These models “explain 
the actual offending behavior of sexual offenders”, but at best what they 
do is identify the explanatory targets of single-factor theories (Level II) 
and multi-factorial (Level III) theories (Ward & Hudson, 1998, 48). 
Given models at this level are primarily descriptive, our hypothetical 
practitioner will not gain much guidance about how to structure an 
effective correctional intervention for sex offenders on the basis of such 
models. 
3.2. Correctional treatment theories 
Even if explanatory theories of crime offer little guidance as to how 
to design a rehabilitative treatment program for sexual offenders, we 
might anticipate that our practitioner will have better results consulting 
theories that are designed specifically to inform correctional in-
terventions. In fact, in the correctional psychology literature, she will 
find a number of different theoretical frameworks associated with 
etiological models that point to modifiable causal factors that may serve 
as targets of her treatment interventions (e.g., Ward & Durrant, 2021). 
For example, Beech and Ward's (2004; see also Beech & Ward, 2016; 
Ward and Fortune, 2016)) risk-responsivity model, which is a compo-
nent of a broader etiological theory of criminal behavior, emphasizes the 
role that psychological risk factors (e.g., intimacy deficits) play as vul-
nerabilities that might result in a sexual offender reoffending. In 
contrast, Bonta and Andrew's (e.g., 2017) Risk-Need-Responsivity 
(RNR) model of offender rehabilitation “outlines both the central cau-
ses of persistent criminal behavior, and some broad principles for 
reducing engagement in crime” (Polaschek, 2012, 2). Both etiological 
models contain features that ought to make them viable candidates for 
aiding our practitioner in developing an effective treatment intervention 
program for those sexual offenders with whom she is working. Specif-
ically, she could design an intervention program directed at reducing 
psychological or other risks that increase the probability that her clients 
will reoffend. She might aim to identify their specific needs and develop 
treatment programs that “engage” them in ways that “help them learn 
4 Given that the relevant literature has focused on sexual offending, I want to 
consider things from the perspective of a clinician or treatment program 
designer who aims to use a therapeutic approach to this form of criminal 
behavior, but following Ward and Durrant (2021), I take the general lessons to 
be applicable to other forms of criminal behavior). 
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and change” using “behavioral and cognitive-behavioral techniques” 
aimed at promoting “prosocial behavior” (Polaschek, 2012, 3). 
Ward and Durrant (2021) and Devon Polaschek (2012) identify 
different but complementary reasons why these and other intervention 
models in correctional psychology are insufficient to guide the devel-
opment of treatment interventions. According to Ward and Durrant 
(2021), correctional treatment theories, although “they typically 
contain a set of treatment aims, a specification of possible change 
mechanisms and an analysis of how program components are likely to 
bring about change in the problems being addressed”, fall short of 
providing guidance insofar as they tend to be pitched at too general of a 
level making it unclear how to translate them “into concrete treatment 
aims and interventions”. In her critique of the RNR model of correctional 
rehabilitation, in contrast, Devon Polaschek (2012) claims that any 
evaluation of the merits and failings of a criminal justice intervention 
theory must be sensitive to the level of generality and abstraction at 
which that theory is pitched (see also Ward, 2021). The metatheoretical 
structure of intervention theories in correctional psychology, she claims, 
is similar to the multi-level structure Ward and Hudson (1998) attribute 
to etiological theories of crime (as described in the previous section). 
Polaschek (2012) argues that the multi-level structure of interven-
tion theories in correctional psychology complicates the task of trans-
lating these theories into practical interventions. According to 
Polaschek, at the top-most level are “multi-factorial rehabilitation the-
ories that are” like the etiological theories Ward and Hudson (1998) 
place at Level I, “broad in focus and lacking sufficient detail to directly 
shape the design of specific interventions” (Polaschek, 2012, 5). More-
over, Polaschek claims that these models are “integrative hybrids” (see 
e.g., Ward, Melser, & Yates, 2007) that are “informed partly by aetio-
logical theories, but also incorporate[] the underlying values and as-
sumptions of intervention, therapy strategies, change processes, 
programme context and setting, and implementation issues, all in an 
abstract ‘high level’, way” (Polaschek, 2012, 5). Thus, intervention 
theories situated at this level will serve as an inadequate guide for our 
practitioner to implement them into an effective treatment program for 
sexual offenders. 
One level down (Level II) exist approaches to intervention that “vary 
by offender characteristics” and are directed at specific offenses, cate-
gories of offenses or types of offenders. For example, at this level our 
practitioner will encounter models that provide insight on the appro-
priate kinds of treatment responses for sexual offenders and other 
models that are aimed specifically at treating violent offenders. These 
theories are hybrids because they “comprise elements of theory, 
research, and practice resources, but at an intermediate level of 
abstractness and detail” (Polaschek, 2012, 6). Ward and Durrant (2021) 
also emphasize that intervention theories tend to be designed to respond 
to specific types of offenses and offenders, rather than focusing on other 
crime related phenomena that may be more appropriate targets for 
rehabilitative interventions such as relationship conflicts, mood distur-
bances, and related factors that may be predictive as to whether a 
criminal will reoffend. Theories as this level, thus, will also provide 
inadequate guidance for developing effective treatment interventions 
for those individuals in our practitioner's care. 
At the bottommost level of Polaschek's meta-theoretical representa-
tion of intervention theories, our practitioner will encounter “inter-
vention theories for specific rehabilitation programmes”, which describe 
“the programme, its processes and content, therapist characteristics, 
intended client group, etc.” (Polaschek, 2012, 5). Theories at this level 
are descriptive with respect to particular therapeutic contexts, much like 
their etiological counterparts at this level that describe specific criminal 
behaviors. Although these theories on their own may show how a 
particular intervention theory was implemented in a particular setting, 
they do not provide guidance as to how to translate that intervention to 
other different local settings, such as that setting in which our practi-
tioner is working. 
Polaschek (2012, 5) emphasizes the importance of correctional 
program designers understanding where a given intervention theory 
that they are consulting is located within this multi-tiered framework 
because doing so “provides clearer expectations about how to judge” the 
“quality” of the theory “relative to [its] intended purpose and [its] 
inherent strengths and weaknesses” for achieving specific treatment 
aims. Using the RNR model as her target, Polaschek claims that the most 
detailed treatment of the model in the scientific literature would require 
our practitioner to gain an understanding of “the complexity of the 
material” associated with the model even if she only sought to imple-
ment the most basic principles of the model (Polaschek, 2012, 8). 
Polaschek also emphasizes that “the theoretical resources needed to 
translate” the RNR model “into intervention design, individual clinical 
formulations, treatment plans, and change monitoring” are still lacking 
(Polaschek, 2012, 8). In other words, the burden of translating the 
theory into practice falls upon the practitioner herself, when our prac-
titioner may lack the relevant educational background and training to 
engaging in such translational work. Polaschek also claims given that 
“[o]ur scientific understanding both of treatment targets and treatment 
change processes remains unsophisticated”, rather than further efforts 
being directed at building “integrated models” they should instead be 
directed at single-factor intervention theories situated at Level II in her 
proposed framework (Polaschek, 2012, 9). At the time of Polaschek's 
writing certain types of criminal offending had not been the focus of 
sufficient theoretical work and in instances in which Level II interven-
tion theories for some forms of criminal behavior were absent from the 
theoretical literature, therapists and program designers lacked adequate 
guidance as to which intervention theory to choose. 
A final relevant issue that Polaschek discusses is the potential for 
important components of criminal intervention theories to be “lost in 
translation” when a practitioner goes to translate a model like the RNR 
model into practice in the form of a correctional intervention (see also 
Ward & Maruna, 2007). Some models are not as clear or understandable 
or their level of clarity may vary depending upon the theoretical back-
grounds and educational training of those who appeal to them. This 
might prompt “students of correctional psychology” to appeal to 
“summaries of” a given “model”, which are at best “social constructions” 
that may potentially abstract away important aspects of the model 
rather than revealing what its originators intended in introducing it 
(Polaschek, 2012, 11). Additionally, sometimes “inferences are made 
about” a model “based not in the published literature, but on observa-
tions of interventions intended to operationalize it” (Polaschek, 2012, 
11). In other words, despite the resources that a given model offers for 
effecting and targeting interventions, a program designer may oper-
ationalize that model in terms of a single intervention, even though the 
model itself affords more avenues for intervention. 
In summary, the metatheoretical literature in correctional psychol-
ogy (see also Prujean, Ward, & Vandevelde, 2021; Ward, 2002, 2021; 
Ward & Birdgen, 2007; Ward, Haig, McDonald (forthcoming); Ward & 
Heffernan, 2017; Ward & Hudson, 1998; Beech & Ward, 2016) is sug-
gestive that our practitioner will not be well served with respect to her 
aims of developing better treatment approaches for her clients who have 
committed sexual offenses by looking at the theoretical and etiological 
literature in correctional psychology alone. Something more is needed, 
and Ward and Durrant (2021) are introducing the concept of “practice 
frameworks” to open a new area of theoretical work to fill this gap. 
4. Practice frameworks 
Previous metatheoretical discussions aimed at facilitating progress in 
treating crime historically have called upon theorists to structure their 
conceptual-theoretical practices in ways that better facilitate the trans-
lation of etiological and treatment theories into practice. Yet, a primary 
motivation for Ward and Durrant's (2021) article on “practice frame-
works” is that there remains a disconnect between the conceptual tools 
and translational resources that etiological and treatment theories offer 
and those that correctional program designers require. Ward and 
J.A. Sullivan                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Aggression and Violent Behavior xxx (xxxx) xxx
5
Durrant claim that they additionally need “practice frameworks”—a 
concept that they introduce to distinguish a novel type of conceptual- 
theoretical tool that they believe is implicitly at work in correctional 
practices but has not yet been explicitly recognized. 
What is a “practice framework”? In basic terms, if we think of 
correctional program designers as builders of correctional treatment or 
rehabilitative programs, a practice framework is the supporting struc-
ture for the development of these programs. Consider again our practi-
tioner who is trying to modify the type of treatment intervention she is 
using with her clients who have committed sexual offenses. She has 
specific goals in mind for the treatment, for example, certain kinds of 
changes in the psychological states and behaviors of her clients. These 
goals are informed by normative assumptions and value judgments that 
she may or may not explicitly recognize (see e.g., Day et al., 2019). For 
example, she has specific beliefs about which kinds of behaviors are 
ethically appropriate (e.g., being an upstanding citizen) and which kinds 
of behaviors are morally unacceptable (e.g., committing sexual offenses) 
as well as which kinds of personality traits are good and which are bad. 
She also likely values the well-being of her clients and may understand 
that concept as pertaining broadly to their mental or physical health. 
She may also value the well-being of the community at large as equally 
important. She will begin with a host of other kinds of assumptions, 
likely shaped by her educational background and previous training. For 
example, she will take a particular ontological stance towards her clients 
insofar as she may view them through a sociological or psychological 
rather than a biological lens. Given that these kinds of assumptions will 
dictate how she conceptualizes what crime is, why it occurs and where 
she will go to look for causes, Ward and Durrant take core ethical and 
normative assumptions and knowledge-related values and assumptions 
as fundamental tiers of practice frameworks (Levels 1 and 2). These two 
levels inform decisions about which intervention strategies are best 
suited to achieve specific treatment aims and the targets or “objects” at 
which correctional interventions should be directed. Practice frame-
works, according to Ward and Durrant, emerge as normative assump-
tions are wedded to etiological theories of criminal behavior and 
correctional treatment theories. 
As we learned in Section 3.2, correctional treatment theories are 
themselves often hybrids that arise as correctional psychologists who 
have developed etiological theories of crime work to translate them into 
treatment theories (e.g., Bonta and Andrews' translation of the RNR 
model (Bonta and Andrews, 2017)) sufficient to shape correctional 
program development. However, correctional treatment and rehabili-
tation theories are insufficient hybrids not only because of the reasons 
Polaschek (2012) identifies, but also, Ward and Durrant claim, because 
neither correctional treatment nor etiological theories make explicit the 
values and normative assumptions on which they are based. Given how 
fundamental normative assumptions and values are in science in general 
(e.g., Douglas, 2009) and in correctional psychology in particular, Ward 
and Durrant claim that we need a metatheoretical concept to capture the 
actual tools that are involved in the move from theory to practice in 
correctional psychology—namely, practice frameworks. 
It is important to point out that Ward and Durrant (2021) indicate 
that practice frameworks exist in both pure and applied contexts. 
Although my strategy for characterizing practice frameworks has been 
from the perspective of a practitioner involved in the development and 
delivery of a specific treatment program for sexual offenders, theorists 
working in basic science may construct and build practice frameworks 
that are the focus of research, and correctional program developers and 
clinicians who work directly with criminal offenders may construct 
practice frameworks that guide program design and are informed by 
basic and applied research. In both pure and applied cases, developing a 
practice framework requires (a) translational work—translating com-
ponents of etiological and treatment theories in ways conducive to their 
practical application in the form of correctional programs, (b) normative 
work that includes making value judgments about individuals who 
commit crimes and criminal behaviors more generally explicit as well as 
identifying the goals and values of correctional practices and (c) 
constructive work to “bridge” theoretical ideas about the etiology of 
criminal behavior, theoretical ideas about potential loci at which to 
intervene and normative assumptions together. 
Ward and Durrant consider two so-called “practice frameworks” in 
detail: Restorative Justice (e.g., Walgrave, 2008) and The Good Lives 
Model (e.g., Ward, 2002) (See also Ward et al., 2021). Importantly they 
note that neither of these theories was introduced into the correctional 
psychology literature as a practice framework and that they are simply 
doing the work to translate these two theories into practice frameworks. 
They are thus engaged in the kind of translational work that they believe 
researchers who are interested in positively impacting the development 
of correctional and treatment programs for criminal behavior should be 
engaged. For our purposes, we need only consider one of the two the-
ories that Ward and Durrant translate. I will consider the Good Lives 
Model, which is directed at enhancing the well-being of individuals who 
commit crimes. 
The Good Lives Model, introduced (Ward, 2002) and developed by 
Ward and colleagues (Laws & Ward, 2011; Ward, Gannon, & Mann, 
2007; Ward & Maruna, 2007), is based on a set of normative assump-
tions, namely that all human beings have dignity, are entitled to a basic 
set of rights and that they should be allowed to be self-determining. The 
model also assumes that risks to an individual's dignity, their rights and 
their capacity to be self-determining exist and that there are certain 
kinds of goods that, if an individual has those goods, will promote their 
dignity and their autonomy and position them so that they are not 
stripped of their rights. Additionally, the model assumes that human 
beings have teleological aims – they seek out goods that will enable them 
to actualize their capacity to be self-determining. Given certain in-
equalities that exist among persons, then, insofar as goods are not 
distributed equally, offending behavior may itself be causally explained 
as an attempt to secure goods that one lacks that stand in the way of 
one's ability to be self-determining or to live a good life. Correctional 
interventions on this model are “formulated collaboratively” by a 
correctional program designer and the individual who has committed an 
offense. Together, they develop a “good lives treatment plan” for the 
individual that is based on that individual's perspective on what “con-
stitutes the good life” for them. Therapeutic interventions are directed at 
encouraging the individual to engage in behaviors that promote their 
well-being—actions that will enable them to attain “future-oriented 
secondary goods” by “satisfying primary goods in socially acceptable 
ways” (Ward & Durrant, 2021, 7). If we consider again our practitioner 
who is aiming to improve her approach to treating individuals who have 
committed sexual offenses, she might find value in the Good Lives Model 
and identify with the basic set of normative assumptions at its core. 
Specifically, she may believe that her aim should be to promote the well- 
being of her clients and recognize that they are autonomous agents who 
should have the right to be self-determining. She also may suppose that 
achieving well-being requires the attainment of certain primary goods 
and understand that she must collaboratively work with her clients to 
determine what having a good life means to them and to develop an 
action plan to help them attain basic goals in socially acceptable ways so 
as to eventually achieve a “good life”. 
Ward and Durrant claim that the concept of “practice framework” 
may be used to identify diverse kinds of frameworks (like the Good Lives 
and Restorative Justice frameworks (see also Ward et al., 2021) on the 
Evidence-Based Practice Framework) on offer in the literature in pure 
and applied correctional psychology. According to them, each frame-
work corresponds to a specific cluster of problems (“niche”) to which 
individuals who commit crimes may be subject. Each framework is 
associated with different targets for treatment or rehabilitative in-
terventions. For example, the Risk-Need-Responsivity model is aimed at 
reducing those psychological and environmental risk factors that may 
leave a person vulnerable to reoffending. Narrative practice frame-
works, in contrast, may point to therapeutic strategies that enable a 
person who has committed an offense to develop a richer self- 
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understanding that may enable them to understand why they committed 
a crime or to understand themselves apart from that crime. Desistance 
frameworks will instead focus on how to reintegrate individuals who 
have committed offenses into familial and social networks. As Ward and 
Durrant emphasize, individuals who commit criminal offenses often 
struggle with a host of different kinds of problems that cannot be 
addressed within the confines of a single practice framework. Thus, 
practitioners should be prepared to bring multiple different practice 
framework perspectives to bear in a “coordinated way” when devel-
oping correctional treatment interventions while recognizing that 
sometimes aspects (e.g., concepts, values, causes) of these practice 
frameworks may overlap (e.g., Ward & Durrant, 2021). It is important to 
note that building bridges between different practice frameworks either 
in theory or in practice is a different kind of work than simply taking a 
single theory or model and translating it into a practice framework. I will 
revisit this point in the next section (Section 5). However, I want to end 
this section by briefly considering how our practitioner might come to 
coordinate perspectives from two practice frameworks in order to treat 
her clients. 
Although the Good Lives Model is directed at ensuring an individual's 
well-being, as our practitioner collaboratively begins to work with her 
clients who have committed sexual offenses to develop a “good lives 
plan”, it may become clear that some of her clients fail to know who they 
are – i.e., they may be unable to collaborate in formulating a good lives 
plan for themselves because their identity and concept of self is not clear 
to them and without it they cannot begin to think about what a good life 
might be for them. This is when our practitioner might consult the 
theoretical literature and discover a narrative approach to treatment, 
which makes different kinds of assumptions and valuations about per-
sons, posits different ideas of what kinds of factors play a role in the 
cultivation of a personal identity, and specifies different therapeutic 
strategies that may enable an individual to discover or recover their 
narrative identity, which is the normative goal of treatment intervention 
in this practice framework. Our practitioner may thus aim to coordinate 
the normative, etiological and intervention components associated with 
narrative identity theory with elements of the Good Lives Model in her 
correctional treatment program. 
5. Practice frameworks: an appraisal 
In light of the descriptive work undertaken in the previous sections of 
the paper, I now want to turn to a critical appraisal of Ward and Dur-
rant's (2021) concept of practice frameworks. On the one hand, I aim to 
identify some reasons why the introduction of this metatheoretical 
concept is fundamental for advancing effective treatment or correctional 
responses to crime. On the other, I aim to point to some pragmatic and 
conceptual hurdles to implementing multiple different practice frame-
works in a “coordinated way” in applied contexts. I will argue, however, 
that these hurdles are not insurmountable. 
As I understand it, historically in correctional psychology, theorists 
who have put forward explanatory theories of crime have sought to use 
those theories as a basis for identifying where in the causal nexus to 
intervene to ensure individuals who have committed crimes do not 
reoffend. However, explanatory and correctional theories historically 
have been formulated without explicit statement of the normative as-
sumptions and values at their core. So, as a first pass, one important 
contribution of Ward and Durrant's metatheoretical concept is that it 
calls on theorists in correctional psychology to make the values and 
assumptions at their heart of their theories explicit. If theorists respond 
to this call, to the extent that etiological and treatment theories are 
rewritten as practice frameworks that make explicit the relationships 
between treatment strategies, the values and assumptions on which they 
are based and the goals of treatment, it may go some way to addressing 
Polaschek's (2012) concerns about difficulties with implementing 
correctional treatment theories in practice. 
Ward and Durrant also illustrate the nature of the kind of 
translational work in which other theorists ought to engage with their 
translation of the Good Lives and Restorative Justice Models. They thus 
provide exemplars that may serve as guides for other theoreticians to 
explicitly translate other etiological or intervention theories into prac-
tice frameworks. It may be that some theories will not be so easily cast in 
a practice framework mold, and this may be revealing as to the efficacy 
of those theories for use in practical contexts. 
Ward and Durrant (2021) also regard it as fundamental for correc-
tional program designers to make the components of the practice 
frameworks they use in applied settings explicit. If we interpret this as a 
normative prescription, practitioners working with individuals who 
have committed crimes need to ask themselves a relevant set of ques-
tions that correspond to the multi-level structure Ward and Durrant 
attribute to practice frameworks. Such questions include: (1) What are 
my values, normative commitments and the ultimate goal of the treat-
ment interventions I am offering? (2) What am I assuming about those 
individuals with whom I am working who have committed crimes? What 
model am I using to conceptualize these individuals and what kinds of 
causal factors do I regard as fundamental for explaining their behavior 
and human behavior more generally? and (3) With respect to which 
causal factors should I aim to intervene in order to best treat them? 
Encouraging practitioners to engage reflectively about the structure of 
the practice framework(s) they use and urging them to make the com-
ponents of that structure explicit can only serve to promote the devel-
opment of more effective interventions for responding to crime. 
Despite the obvious benefits of the “practice frameworks” perspec-
tive, it is relevant to ask whether there are any notable hurdles to (a) the 
successful implementation of practice frameworks and (b) the successful 
bridging of different practice frameworks in a coordinated way in 
applied contexts. As Ward and Durrant (2021) claim in their paper, the 
practice frameworks that they are considering (Restorative Justice and 
Good Lives Models) are pitched at a very general level and they are also 
theories that adopt a single normative-explanatory-intervention 
perspective rather than being “integrated” with other theories presum-
ably existing on the same level. This prompts a question as to whether 
practice frameworks may be conceived of as conforming to a three-level 
structure, much like etiological (e.g., Ward & Hudson, 1998) and 
intervention theories (Polaschek, 2012) of crime do, and whether this 
may have implications for implementing practice frameworks and/or 
developing or coordinating a plurality of such frameworks in correc-
tional settings. We might imagine that one level up from the Good Lives 
and Restorative Justice Models in the practice framework hierarchy, we 
might find practice frameworks aimed at building bridges between 
different practice frameworks like those we encounter one level down 
(Level 2). At the bottommost level, we may find descriptive accounts of 
practice frameworks that have been implemented in a specific correc-
tional setting either individually or in a coordinated way. If this rough 
picture captures anything accurate about the metatheoretical structure 
of practice frameworks, it may have implications for the ease of relying 
on the theoretical literature to translate practice frameworks from 
theoretical to applied contexts. It means that theorists and practitioners 
on the ground ought to be sensitive to the nature of the kind of practice 
framework(s) they are appealing to in order to develop a treatment 
intervention and/or what theories or components they are “plugging 
into” a practice framework or building bridges between or among. I take 
this to be in part what Ward and Durrant mean when they claim that 
there will be “a plurality of practice frameworks” on offer in the 
correctional psychology literature and this “means that practitioners 
need to be theoretically literate and appreciate the need to match the 
model to the problem” and “be aware of the hybrid nature of practice 
frameworks and the implications of this complexity when it comes to 
evaluating competing approaches” (Ward & Durrant, 2021, 6). 
Given the potentially complex structure of practice frameworks, 
then, a relevant question is whether it is possible for a single practitioner 
to attain the level of theoretical literacy requisite to effectively imple-
ment one or to coordinate multiple different practice frameworks in 
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correctional settings. It is important to note that it is already difficult for 
a practitioner to get a handle on the meaning of a whole host of theo-
retical constructs that correctional psychologists deploy. For example, 
terms used to pick out causal variables (e.g. “risk factors” (Fortune & 
Heffernan, 2019; Ward & Durrant, 2021; see also Mattu & Sullivan, 
2021; Sullivan, 2019)) may be only loosely defined within a given 
theoretical framework and different theorists who use the same terms 
may mean different things by them. Flexibility in defining theoretical 
terms is a common feature of the theoretical landscape in correctional 
psychology but such conceptual pluralism makes it difficult for practi-
tioners to readily grasp the meaning of theoretical terms or to under-
stand how different theoretical frameworks (in this case, practice 
frameworks) that contain the same terms may be related to each other. 
So, while Ward and Durrant place the burden of theoretical literacy on 
practitioners working in applied contexts, it is important to emphasize 
the kind of rigorous and coordinated conceptual-theoretical work that 
theoreticians promoting different practice frameworks must engage in 
order to ease the practitioner's burdens. What Polaschek (2012) claims 
with respect to correctional treatment theories is also applicable to 
practice frameworks; if translating and implementing them in practice 
puts too much of a conceptual burden on correctional program de-
signers, important aspects of these frameworks are likely to be “lost in 
translation”. 
Such problems, however, are not insoluble if we interpret Ward and 
Durrant's call for “coordinated pluralism” to apply to theoretical, 
educational, and practical contexts in correctional psychology in which 
practice frameworks are developed, taught, and applied (See also Sul-
livan, 2017) on "coordinated pluralism" in psychiatric research). Spe-
cifically, theoreticians should aim for conceptual clarity and lay the 
groundwork for links to be made between different practice frameworks 
informed by different perspectives, interests, and knowledge bases. 
Theorists hailing from different theoretical perspectives also should 
engage in collaborative work to illuminate points of divergence and 
convergence among different practice frameworks. In order to ensure 
the theoretical literacy of future practitioners who aim to work in 
applied contexts, students in correctional psychology programs should 
be exposed to different practice frameworks and collaboratively trained 
in how to bring them collectively to bear in developing effective treat-
ment or rehabilitative programs. One component of such training could 
be to provide students with hypothetical scenarios of individuals who 
have committed criminal offenses that forces them to collaboratively 
learn to link together different practice frameworks to develop effective 
treatment interventions. Such training will best prepare correctional 
psychology students aiming to work in applied contexts with the skills 
requisite to develop “coordinated” approaches to treatment that appeal 
to resources from a plurality of different practice framework perspec-
tives. Ideally, teams of practitioners working in applied contexts who are 
specialized in different practice frameworks will work collaboratively to 
develop correctional treatment programs; if individual offenders with 
whom they are work present with problems that cannot be addressed 
within the confines of a single practice framework, these practitioners 
may collaboratively bring a set of practice frameworks to bear that offer 
more suitable options for treatment or rehabilitative interventions. Such 
"local" coordinated pluralism may thus enable the realization of a more 
“precision treatment” approach in correctional psychology. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I described and evaluated the concept of practice 
frameworks in correctional psychology, situating my analysis within the 
broader contexts of philosophical understandings of theories and models 
and metatheoretical work in forensic psychology on theories, frame-
works and models. I explained why I think Ward and Durrant's intro-
duction of the concept in the metatheoretical literature in correctional 
psychology is important for progress in developing effective correctional 
responses to crime and I raised and responded to some questions 
pertaining to the feasibility of implementing a “coordinated pluralism” 
approach to practice frameworks in applied settings. 
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